![]() Murdoch, S.J., Drimer, S., Anderson, R., Bond, M.: Chip and pin is broken. Mayes, K., Markantonakis, K., Chen, C.: Smart card platform fingerprinting. įrench prosecution case number 1116791060 EMV Specification (Book 3), version 4.2 (2008). EMV Specification (Book 2), version 4.2 (2008). EMV Specification (Book 1), version 4.2 (2008). The forensic analysis relied on X-ray chip imaging, side-channel analysis, protocol analysis, and microscopic optical inspections.ĮMVCo. The entire assembly is embedded in the plastic body of yet another stolen card. The second chip plays the role of the man-in-the-middle and communicates directly with the point of sale terminal. The first chip is clipped from a genuine stolen card. These forgeries are remarkable in that they embed two chips wired top-to-tail. This indeed happened in 2011, when about 40 sophisticated card forgeries surfaced in the field. ![]() (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp 433–446, 2010) demonstrated the attack using a general purpose FPGA board, noting that “miniaturization is mostly a mechanical challenge, and well within the expertise of criminal gangs”. (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp 433–446, 2010) described a man-in-the-middle attack against EMV cards. This paper describes the forensic analysis of what the authors believe to be the most sophisticated smart card fraud encountered to date.
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